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Overview 
The UK economy also believe that UK interest rates have risen too quickly over the middle of 2004 and ultimately this has contributed 
to the low growth seen in the economy. The UK labour 
market remains relatively buoyant despite some signs of 
tightening and our expectation is that services will 
continue to lead employment growth while unemployment 
There remains strong growth in the US, Japan and the Far 
East despite a significant slowing in China and weaker data 
from the US. Japan is performing better than expected while 
the Euro Area is still relatively weak. The Euro Area is 
however, forecast to pick up in 2005. Inflationar y pressures 
are continuing to build in the world economy principally 
because of capacity constraints and higher oil prices. The 
monetary authorities are taking what they believe is the 
most appropriate response to inflation in the sphere of 
influence. The Federal Reserve has indicated interest rates 
will rise further and the ECB are holding interest rates as 
are the Bank of Japan. The main downside risks are the 
imbalances in the world economy and the prospect of 
sustained higher oil prices. Overall the conditions in the 
world economy remain favourable. 
 
UK real GDP growth was only 0.4 per cent in 2004Q3 after 
growth of 0.7 per cent and 0.9 per cent in the first and 
second quarters respectfully. This may mean that the upper 
limit of the Chancellor‟s forecast of 3.5 per cent for real 
GDP growth may be unobtainable now. It may be however, 
that GDP growth of 3.3 per cent could still be achieved in 
the UK, if this is a temporary phenomenon rather than a 
sustained slowing of growth. Investment is a more 
important driver of growth now and both consumption and 
government spending contribute significantly to domestic 
demand. There will be a more substantial pick up in trade 
when the Euro Area recovers more fully. Inflation remains 
relatively low in the UK economy with CPI inflation of only 
1.1 per cent in the 12 months to September. We are still 
concerned about the current account deficit and PSNB. We 
will remain at relatively low levels. The outlook for the UK 
economy is still relatively promising. 
 
 
Outlook 
The consensus forecasts for the main UK economic 
indicators taken from a monthly survey by HM Treasury of 
City and other independent forecasters are presented in 
Table 1. Real GDP growth is forecast to be 3.3 per cent in 
2004 and 2.5 per cent in 2005. There has been little 
change to the Treasury forecasts since the last quar ter. 
Inflation (using the CPI measure) is forecast to be 1.3 per 
cent in 2004 and 1.8 per cent in 2005. When we look at 
the difference between CPI and RPIX inflation we see that 
they are both close to target by 2005 and certainly by 
2006. As explained below this may be due to expectations. 
The Bank of England increased interest rates in February, 
May, June and August of 2004 and this is discussed in 
further detail below. Interest rates are now 4.75 per cent in 
the UK. Clearly concerns over house price growth, debt and 
markets continue to either dominate or unduly influence 
thinking at the Bank of England. It is difficult to assess the 
weight that is put on the different aspects of the economy. 
Current implicit messages from the Bank may suggest that 
interest rates have peaked in the UK. The forecast for 
unemployment is that it should remain low and that the 
growth in average earnings over 2004-06 will be non- 
inflationary. There is little evidence to suggest that wage 
pressure is mounting in the economy. Both the current 
account and the PSNB give cause for concern (especially 
the latter). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Independent forecasts of the UK economy  
  
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
Real GDP growth (%) 
 
3.3 
 
2.5 
 
2.5 
Inflation rate (CPI %) 1.5 1.8 2.0 
Inflation rate (RPIX %) 2.3 2.3 2.4 
Inflation rate (RPI %) 3.2 2.6 2.5 
Claimant count, million) 0.84 0.85 0.85 
Employment  growth (%) 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Average Earnings (%) 4.5 4.4 4.4 
Sterling Effective Exchange Rate 
Current account (£ billion) 
PSNB (£ billion) 
100.1 
-26.3 
35.2 
100.5 
-27.9 
36.2 
99.4 
-29.3 
35.7 
 
Source: National Statistics, National Institute Economic Review, 189, July 2004 and “Forecasts for the UK economy”, HM Treasury, October 2004. 
Note: PSNB is given for financial years, e.g. 2004/05 
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UK macroeconomic trends 
 
Output growth 
UK second quarter chained volume GDP growth (2001 
prices, where 2001=100) was 0.4 per cent compared to 0.9 
per cent in the second quarter of 2004 and 0.7 per cent in 
the first quarter. The level of GDP is now 3.1 per cent higher 
than it was in 2003Q3 but down from the 3.4 per cent 
recorded in the last quar ter. GVA at basic prices also 
increased in the third quarter by 0.4. This is the preliminary 
estimate and the data may yet be subject to revision. 
 
Services are estimated to have grown by 0.8 per cent in the 
third quarter compared to 0.9 per cent in the second 
quar ter. Distribution, hotels and catering only grew by 0.7 
per cent in the third quarter whereas in the second they 
grew by 1.2 per cent. Production industries declined by 1.1 
per cent in the latest quarter after growing by 1.2 per cent 
in the previous quar ter. Although there is no data available 
for manufacturing we have to assume that UK 
manufacturing has declined significantly because 
manufacturing is 79 per cent of production. Also, in the 
previous two quarters when manufacturing figures were – 
0.2 and 1.2 per cent respectively the corresponding figures 
for production were –0.4 and 1.2 per cent. There are no 
data for the third quarter for agriculture, construction nor 
the sub-sectors of manufacturing and services. Second 
quarter growth for manufacturing was 1.2 per cent or 0.4 
per cent over the year. In agriculture there was a slight 
contraction and on an annual basis the sector decline d by 
2.6 per cent. There was only 0.6 per cent growth in 
construction in the second quarter but the industry grew by 
4.9 per cent over the year. 
 
Components of demand 
Again, there is not any data for the third quarter available 
yet. In the second quarter of 2004, consumption increased 
by 0.6 per cent giving growth over the year of 2.3 per cent. 
Government spending increased by 0.4 per cent in 2004Q2 
but on an annual basis growth was 3.5 per cent. This is the 
strongest component of demand in the UK economy. 
Investment increased by 2.4 per cent in the second quarter 
taking growth in investment to 2.2 per cent over the year. 
Exports grew by 1.5 per cent in the second quarter but 
growth on an annual basis was marginal (0.1 per cent). 
Import growth remains relatively strong at 1.1 per cent in 
2004Q2 and over the year growth was 1.3 per cent – 
considerably above that of exports. 
 
We believe that the data we have seen for the UK are in line 
with both the global environment and the economic 
situation in the UK. Consumption may slow slightly due to 
higher interest rates and cooling house prices but 
government spending is expected to remain strong. 
Investment is clearly becoming an important driver while 
net exports are making a negative contribution to UK GDP 
and this may not be positive until 2006. These movements 
are in line with current forecasts as we expect UK growth to 
be supported by consumption (stronger in the second half 
of 2004 than in the first) and government spending, with 
public sector investment volumes set to grow at 30 per 
cent this year. We anticipate the government sector 
(consumption and investment) to contribute about 1 per 
cent of UK GDP in 2004 and just less than 1 per cent in 
2005. 
 
The National Accounts were rebased using 2001 as a base 
year but this has resulted in a significant revision to UK 
government consumption. The largest revisions occurred in 
2002 and 2003. Government consumption growth was 
revised up by 1.3 and 1.6 percentage points respectively 
due to this. One of the issues that is a main contributor to 
this is the way health output is measured (see ONS (2004) 
„Revisions resulting from improving the methodology for 
measuring government healthcare output in the National 
Accounts.‟) When looking at forecasts of the UK it should 
be noted that over the period 2004-06 this could add 
approximately 0.5 percentage points to government 
consumption growth in these years (see NIER, (2004) 189, 
July). 
 
 
Inflation and interest rates 
CPI inflation for the year up to September 2004 was 1.1 per 
cent while RPIX was 1.9 per cent and RPI was 3.1 per cent. 
The target for CPI inflation is 2 per cent with the previous 
target for RPIX being 2.5 per cent. Retail sales grew by 1.1 
per cent for the three months to September 2004 and by 
6.9 per cent over the year. The former is the lowest rise 
since August 2003. The implied deflator for September 
2004 on September 2003 indicates a decline of 1.6 per 
cent. Given these data the key questions are why is 
inflation so low at this time and is monetary policy 
appropriate? As stated before here in the QEC, the simplest 
statement of monetary policy is from Svensson (1997), 
p1126: 
 
“If the inflation forecast is on target, monetary policy 
is appropriate. I cannot imagine simpler principles, and 
I cannot imagine anything easier to explain to the 
public, or anything more conducive to public 
understanding of monetary policy.” 
 
So why is inflation so low according to the CPI measure? 
Richard Lambert (a member of the Monetary Policy 
Committee) in his speech (see Lambert (2004)) went some 
way to answering this question. He played down the effects 
of higher oil prices despite prices breaching $50 a barrel 
and the price of Brent crude rising by 43 per cent in the 
twelve months to September. Instead he pointed to the fact 
that house prices may „be on the turn‟ and that high street 
sales may „cool off more rapidly than had been expected.‟ 
Clearly the data for retails sales shows that the increase is 
the slowest since August 2003. However, steel prices 
increased by 34 per cent, house prices rose by 19 per cent, 
gas and electricity increased by 6 per cent, as did council 
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tax bills. When household bills are taken together then they 
account for nearly 20 per cent of the RPI and we also know 
that this particular part of that basket has increased by 11 
per cent. But prices are falling for other components of the 
basket, e.g. clothing (decreased by 40 per cent between 
1991 and 2003), food and ICT equipment (this has fallen by 
more than 50 per cent between 1995 and 2002.  Simply it 
is that goods price inflation is weak while services inflation 
since 1997 has been close to 4 per cent. Even in the labour 
market where average earnings have increased by 4.3 per 
cent in the year to September this is accepted as non- 
inflationary growth in wages. The increasing flow of 
imports puts further downward pressure on prices. Lambert 
(op. cit.) also cites increasing technology, globalisation and 
deregulation as further factors that put downward pressure 
on inflation. He believes that inflation (using the CPI 
measure) will remain low and it will be stable. He hints that 
interest rates may have peaked. It is what he does not say 
however that is really interesting. 
 
One of the problems with CPI inflation is that the public 
have yet to get to grips with it. There is an expectations 
factor that has not yet sufficiently adjusted. Broadly, many 
still think of inflation being close to 2.5 per cent (with RPIX, 
it is 1.9 per cent, still some way off 2.5 per cent) but 
expectations may be conditioned on RPIX being close to 2 
per cent. Balls and O‟Donnell (2002) p8 describe the 
„credibility gap‟ between the rate of inflation and the 
expectation of inflation. We may be experiencing this 
problem at the moment where we are anticipating relatively 
higher inflation but for a number of reasons inflation is 
actually significantly lower. Secondly, CPI inflation is 
calculated slightly differently from RPIX. RPIX is calculated 
using an arithmetic average whereas CPI is calculated 
using a geometric mean average. Essentially this reduces 
the weights of those retail outlets where prices are rising 
the fastest. This „formula‟ effect may have reduced inflation 
in the UK by approximately half a percentage point per year 
(see King, 2004). This is why the target has been lowered. 
In fact CPI inflation since 1997 has rarely been above 2 per 
cent. The large difference between CPI and RPIX is that 
RPIX included housing costs and council tax (but excludes 
mortgage interest payments), whereas CPI does not include 
these. When house price inflation is rising at a faster rate 
than prices in general then the gap between RPIX and CPI 
becomes wider. As house price inflation slows then the 
difference will narrow. 
 
This brings us to the next point, if house prices are 
excluded from the measure of CPI but clearly are still 
important in economic decisions of the public then how 
much weight should the MPC attach to house price 
inflation? This is the $64,000 question. We are not given 
that information. There is little doubt that market 
sentiment and house prices are taken very seriously by the 
MPC as financial markets are the first item in the MPC 
minutes. House price inflation takes up a considerable part 
of the debate, particularly the effects on consumption, 
future mortgage lending and debt. Some members of the 
MPC have made statements to the effect that the MPC is 
not there to monitor house prices but inflation per se. Also 
we need to appreciate the two-year lag before the full 
effects of the policy decision impacts fully on prices. There 
are some nagging doubts however, that the Bank of England 
pays too much attention to house price inflation and 
markets rather than concentrating on the inflation target. 
 
This is rather a challenging statement but recent work may 
demonstrate this may be a potential problem. As oil prices 
are high at the moment, it is anticipated that this will 
increase inflation significantly. This has not been seen yet, 
although we accept that oil may move to $30-35 in the 
medium-term. Furthermore the impact of oil shocks on an 
economy largely depends on the response of the monetary 
authorities to them (see Barrell and Pomerantz, 2004a). Oil 
demand has increased by about 0.5 per cent per annum in 
the OECD over the period 1973-2003 while world supply 
grew by 1 per cent per annum. The US, the UK and Europe 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 The impacts of both temporary and permanent price shocks 
 
A 15 per cent permanent shock 
 
Year 
 
Inflation 
Euro Area 
Output 
 
Inflation 
UK 
Output 
 
Inflation 
US 
Output 
2004 0.11 -0.18 0.04 -0.05 0.19 -0.11 
2005 0.07 -0.18 0.09 -0.05 0.38 -0.18 
 
A 30 per cent temporary shock 
 
Year 
 
Inflation 
Euro Area 
Output 
 
Inflation 
UK 
Output 
 
Inflation 
US 
Output 
2004 0.25 -0.25 0.08 -0.05 0.36 -0.09 
2005 0.19 -0.19 0.20 0.01 0.78 -0.13 
 
Source: National Institute Economic Review, July, 189, Tables 6 and Table 7, pp15-17. 
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have all decreased their dependence on oil by about one 
third since the 1970s oil price crisis. Nevertheless, as we 
see in Table 2.1 the impact of the oil price shock will var y 
according to the monetary response This work was carried 
out by the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR) who have undertaken some simulations 
regarding temporary and permanent oil shocks (see Barrel 
and Pomerantz, 2004b). 
 
What is clear from this is that if the shock is temporary then 
the output effect will be less than if the shock is permanent 
because the latter increases long-term interest rates. The 
temporary shock will have a lesser effect on inflation than 
on output because wage bargainers know the shock is 
temporary and adjust accordingly. When compared to the US 
and the Euro Area we see the UK is an intermediate case 
because it remains a net fuel exporter. In the UK the 
temporary shock has half the effect on output as has the 
permanent one in the first year. 
 
What we see in the UK data for the third quarter is very low 
inflation and a considerable drop in output (relative to the 
previous two quarters). This suggests that the oil price rise 
is a small permanent shock in the medium-run (to about 
$30-35). We present output growth and interest rates in 
Figure 2.1. The MPC raised interest rates in May when it 
was probably better to „wait and see‟ (see O‟Carroll, 2004) 
given that the UK has a flexible labour market with non- 
inflationary wage pressure, has low inflation, credible 
monetary policy but could of course be unsure of the 
cyclical position. It is possible however, that the Bank of 
England reacted too quickly to the situation and therefore 
the current profile of interest rate increases have damaged 
UK third quarter growth as manufacturing was still in a 
relatively weak position. The oil price rise would also hit 
utilities, transport, agriculture and sectors where 
consumption is discretionary (travel and tourism, durable 
luxury goods etc.) harder than other (predominately service) 
sectors. While we suggest this is a significant factor in the 
slower growth seen in the UK there are two important 
caveats: 
 
Æ    we are not arguing that interest rates did not need to 
rise but that this is a timing effect and 
 
Æ    we appreciate our case is made with some hindsight 
and that the decisions of the MPC are not made lightly 
or with ease. 
 
 
The labour market 
Employment in the UK rose by 10,000 to 28,392,000 for 
Jun- Aug 2004. The employment rate was 74.7 per cent in 
the same period. There has been an increase of 33,000 
employees for Jun-Aug 2004 over the quar ter to 24,559,000 
and a rise of 189,000 over the year. UK self-employment 
declined by 13,000 over the quar ter to 3,615,000 but still 
has grown by 17,000 over the year. Full-time employment 
grew by 31,000 on a quarterly basis and by 136,000 on an 
annual basis. Part-time employment contracted by 21,000 
 
 
 
 
UK Interest Rates and UK GDP Growth 2001-04 
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over the most recent quarter but still increased by 85,000 
over the year. The Quarterly Survey of Employees indicates 
that total employment increased by 25,000 in June 2004 
compared to a rise of 130,000 over the year. Manufacturing 
employment continued to decline, losing 18,000 jobs on a 
quarterly basis and fell by 95,000 over the year to June 
2004. The service sector increased employment by 
140,000 jobs in the quarter to June 2004 and employment 
in services over the year increased by 206,000 jobs. 
Government supported trainees increased by 6,000 in the 
latest quarter to Jun-Aug 2004 and by 27,000 on an annual 
basis. The number of workforce jobs was 30,324 in June 
2004 with self-employment estimated to be 3,844. The 
workforce jobs series has increased by 10,000 over the 
quar ter and by 1999,000 over the year. The estimate of 
self-employment has declined by 17,000 on a quarterly 
basis but still increased by 59,000 on an annual basis. 
 
Average earnings including bonuses grew by 3.9 per cent 
for the period Jun-Aug 2004. When bonuses are excluded 
the rise was 4.3 per cent. These rates are accepted as 
being non-inflationary and are unlikely to increase 
significantly wage pressure on prices. The economically 
active decreased by 41,000 to 29,780,000 (a rate of 78.4 
per cent) but still rose by 76,000 over the year. The 
economically inactive rose by 91,000 in Jun-Aug 2004 and 
now stands at 21.6 per cent. 
 
ILO unemployment in the UK was 1,387,000 (4.7 per cent) 
in Jun-Aug 2004 whereas claimant count was 834,000 (2.7 
per cent) for September 2004. ILO unemployment 
decreased by 51,000 whereas claimant count only declined 
by 200. Nevertheless, both measures of unemployment are 
relatively low and the UK labour market is performing well. 
There are some signs of tightening but overall all forms of 
employment have demonstrated an increase over the year, 
there is no substantial wage pressure and unemployment is 
relatively low. 
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